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Rooks: Constitutionality of Judicially-Imposed Compulsory Licenses in Co

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDICIALLYIMPOSED COMPULSORY LICENSES
IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASES
I. INTRODUCTION

The general object of this note is to examine the use of compulsory licenses' in copyright law. More specifically, it examines the
increasing likelihood, although of questionable constitutionality, of
judicially-imposed compulsory licensing as a remedy in copyright
infringement cases.
This Note asserts that compulsory licenses are a political
compromise divorced from the policies behind the Copyright Clause
of the United States Constitution. Congress imposed compulsory
licensing in response to technological changes in information
transmission,2 thereby unwittingly extending copyright protection
beyond the scope of the Copyright Clause. Compulsory licenses,
while politically pragmatic, grant a copyright owner plenary rights
instead of the bundle of exclusive rights ordinarily granted by
copyright law. Additionally, this Note contends that because lower
courts misunderstand the nature and scope of copyright law, they,
misled by that confusion, are threatening to turn to compulsory
licensing to settle conflicts between the litigants before them.3
Such an ultra vires remedy should not be imposed because
copyright law is purely a statutory construct, and only Congress is
empowered by the Constitution to create the remedies for copyright
infringement.

1 Compulsory licenses provide for the right to "use a copyrighted work if certain procedures are followed" and a statutorily defined fee is paid. DONALD F. JOHNSTON, COPYRIGHT
HANDBOOK 115 (1978).
2 For example, in the cases of cable and satellite broadcast transmission, Congress'
solution was to grant compulsory licenses. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 n.11, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665 (1984) (reviewing Congressional responses to player pianos, copying
machines, and cable systems).
' American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 899-900 n.19, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1545 (2d Cir.) (1994) ("If the dispute is not now settled, this appears to be an
appropriate case for exploration of the possibility of a court-imposed compulsory license.").
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This Note emphasizes the purposes behind copyright law and
reveals how compulsory licenses conflict with those purposes. The
first section addresses the constitutional basis for statutory
copyright law, focusing on its history and Supreme Court interpretation. The second section traces the use of compulsory licenses
and the arguments advanced for and against their use. Finally,
this Note concludes that judicially imposed compulsory licenses are
unconstitutional.
II. THE PURPOSES BEHIND COPYRIGHT LAW
A. THE STATUTE OF ANNE

Any explication of United States copyright law must begin in
Great Britain with the Statute of Anne.4 The United States
Copyright Clause originated from this 1710 British statute, which
replaced the Stationers' two centuries old monopoly controlling
publishing in England.5
The focus of the Statute of Anne can be gleaned from its
preamble and stated purpose. Its preamble describes the act as
"[a]n act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies
of Printed Books in the Authors ... of such copies. ... ' The
purpose is stated to be "the Encouragement of learned Men to
Compose and write useful Books."7 The Statute transformed the
copyright scheme in important ways:
First, the focus of protection shifted from the publisher to the author. Second, the statute created a
public domain through the requirement that a new
work be created in order to acquire copyright protection. Third, the limited term of the copyright further
strengthened the public benefit. By eliminating the
perpetual copyright, the work was accessible to all
upon expiration of the copyright term. Finally, the
4 Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
6 L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and the 'Exclusive Right of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
1, 9-14 (1993).
6 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
7
id.
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existence of the statute itself embodied the assumption that no adequate right existed at common law.'
The driving force of the Statute of Anne, then, was to curtail
publishers' (Stationers') control over publication, thereby ensuring
public access to information.' The United States Copyright Clause
originated from this Statute.
B. THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW

The Copyright Clause found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of
the United States Constitution, states: "The Congress shall have
Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. " 1°
Read literally, three fundamental policies are advanced by the
clause: (1) to promote learning ("Progress of Science and useful
Arts"); (2) to benefit authors (who get the "exclusive right"); and (3)
to ensure public access (works are protected for "limited times")."
Of these three policies, two benefit the public and one the author;
and the benefit to the author is a means to the ends of promoting
learning and protecting the public domain.12
As a constitutional delegation of power, the clause is a grant of,
and a limitation on, Congress' power to define copyright law."3 As
such, it is a limited monopoly, granted for a limited time, to foster
creation and disseminate knowledge.' 4 Indeed,
" Kristina Rosette, Note, Back to the Future: How Federal Courts Create a Federal
Common Law Copyright Through Permanent Injunctions Protecting Future Works, 2 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 337-38 (1994) (citations omitted).
9 Interview, Professor L. Ray Patterson, February 12, 1995.
'oBecause the clause includes both patent and copyright protection, one can separate the
language and reveal the copyright clause: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote
the Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings . . . [. " L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A
PreliminaryInquiry into the Need for a FederalStatute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 385, 386 n.3 (1992).
" Id. at 394-95.
12 Patterson, supra note 5, at 24.
13
L. Ray Patterson, UnderstandingFairUse, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS, Spring 1992,
at 249, 254.
14 See Patterson, Copyright Overextended, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 385, 388 n.10 (1992)
(citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932): "[T]he primary object in conferring
the monopoly lie[s] in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.");
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[tlhe monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited
grant is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate
the creative activity of authors ... by the provision
of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period
of exclusive control has expired. 5
Copyright law, then, should be understood as a "statutory grant of
a series of limited rights to which the copyrighted work is subject
for only a limited period of time." 6
From the first Copyright Act of 1790 to the Copyright Act of
197617, Congress has attempted to balance the interests of
authors, disseminators (entrepreneurs who publish and distribute
works), and the public (users of the copyrighted works).'" For
example, in its Report concerning the 1909 Copyright Act, the
House Judiciary Committee explains:
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider
... two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public;
and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be
detrimental to the public? The granting of such

see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65
(1975):
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the
limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts.
16 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
16 Patterson, supra note 13, at 251.
17 There have been primarily five Copyright Acts: 1790, 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976.
18Patterson, supra note 10, at 388; see Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Inc., 9
F.3d 823, 839, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Copyright policy is meant to
balance protection, which seeks to ensure a fair return to authors and inventors and thereby
to establish incentives for development, with dissemination, which seeks to foster learning,
progress and development.").
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exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.' 9
The Supreme Court, moreover, has made clear that all of these
interests are not equal, reaffirming that copyright exists primarily
to serve the public interest; authors' and publishers' interests are
therefore secondary.20
That federal copyright law in the United States is a "creature of
statute" cannot be overemphasized.21 "As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted.
...

22

An important aspect of this is that only Congress can

define the remedies available for copyright infringement; therefore,
courts cannot impose common-law remedies under circumstances
that may appear appropriate for such remedies in other areas of
law.2" This fact becomes increasingly important in light of
copyright owners' attempts to persuade courts to apply common-law
principles of property rights in adjudicating copyright disputes
between copyright owners and users.
C. JUDICIAL MISUNDERSTANDING OF COPYRIGHT LAW-A NATURALLAW CONCEPT?

Copyright owners, although thankful for the protection offered by
the statute, continually fight the statute's express limitation of
those protections e.g., fair use."' Their arguments are rooted in
'9 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909).
2 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("[T]he ultimate
aim [of copyright] is ... to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."); Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and
the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.").
2' Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("But the copyright
is the creature
of the Federal statute passed in the exercise of the power vested in Congress."); Krafit v.
Cohen, 117 F.2d 579, 580, 48 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401 (3rd Cir. 1941) ("Copyright... is wholly
a creature of statute.").
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
See generally, Rosette, supra note 8 (discussing federal common law and its place in
copyright law).
24 17 U.S.C. §§ 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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their view that the source of copyright is a natural-law, proprietary
right of the author. As such, the protection they seek by copyright
is plenary 25 and perpetual. While one may choose to hold copyright owners in low regard for their greed, it is the courts which
should be the object of criticism when they apply the property-law
doctrines advocated by the copyright owners.
The basis of the natural-law property right in copyright is the
idea that an author created the work and is therefore entitled to
the fruits of his or her labor. As one nineteenth-century commentator argued:
A work before it is published belongs only to the
author; it is his spoken or written meditation, his
thought, his intellectual being; it is himself; the
author is not bound to account for it to any one, and
is the absolute master to modify or destroy it. The
fruit which he then draws from it is the well-being of
study, the enjoyment of labor and of the exercise of
his faculties; it is that pleasure of creation which is
produced by the birth of ideas.26
Thus, an author is entitled, by natural law, to the fruits of his
labor. Anything less than a perpetual copyright, the argument
goes, is an unjustifiable taking of private property.2 7
The common law protects this proprietary interest of authors up
until the time of publication. Upon publication, statutory copyright
preempts any perpetual, common-law protection because Congress
has power to grant copyrights only for limited times.2 8 Moreover,
an author's act of publication brings his or her rights into the realm
of the rights of others e.g., academics and consumers. 29 Therefore,
the Constitutional mandate to promote learning and protect the
public domain must prevail over an author's post-publication rights.

26 Patterson, supra note 5, at 5.

Id. at 24 n.63 (quoting Charles Renouard, Theory of the Rights of Authors, 22 AM.
JURIST & L. MAG. 39, 43 (1839)).
'2 Id. at 20 n.52 (quoting Eaten S. Drone, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS, at 19 (1879)).
28 See

Patterson, supra note 5, at 8-9.

' See Patterson, supra note 5, at 25.
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If an author seeks statutory benefits e.g., damages, then he or she
must correspondingly accept statutory costs e.g., fair use. °
Traditionally, courts approached copyright issues from a proprietary perspective3 ' and used property-law principles in deciding
conflicts between copyright owner and copyright users. Part of the
explanation for this misconception is that courts fail to recognize
copyright law as being regulatory in nature, and instead focus
entirely on its proprietary aspects.3 2 The consequence is confusion between the use of the work (a proprietary concept) and the
and courts latching onto
use of the copyright (a regulatory concept),
33
the former at the expense of the latter.
Perhaps courts should recognize copyright as quasi-property as
the Supreme Court has done.3 4 As the quasi-property distinction
makes clear, copyright is a regulatory concept "because the real
35
subject of copyright is not the work, but the use of the work."
The difference between property and quasi-property is the scope of
the right to exclude. As Justice Holmes explained in White-Smith
Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.:
The notion of property starts ... from confirmed
possession of a tangible object and consists in the
right to exclude others from interference with the
more or less free doing with it as one wills. But in
copyright, property has reached a more abstract
expression. The right to exclude is not directed to an
object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo, so to

s

A primary limitation on the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is the fair use

doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Through a four-factor balancing test, the doctrine allows the
use of copyrighted materials in a reasonable manner without the consent of the owner. The
factors include: (1) the purpose of the use; (2) the nature of the work; (3) the amount and
significance of the portion used in relation to the work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the work. Id.
"' Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Srvs. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1478, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (11th Cir. 1991).
3' L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright,and FairUse, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1987).
33

id.

' See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), where the Court was
concerned that International News was "reap[ing] where it had not sown" by using AP press
dispatches. Id. at 242. The Court characterized the news reports as "quasi-property for the
purposes of their businesses because they are both selling it as such..." Id.
" Patterson, supra note 32, at 59.
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speak ....
It is a prohibition of conduct remote
from the
persons
or tangibles of the party having the
36
right.
As quasi-property, copyright law regulates the use of the copyright,
not the use of the work. And because it is regulatory in nature,
37
copyright law may be viewed as an unfair competition doctrine:
"the competitor uses the copyright; the consumer uses the work."3 8
Copyright protects the owner against the unfair use by competitors,
not use by consumers. 39 The copyright owner has the right to
interfere with a competitor's use of a copyright, but not with the
consumer's use of a publicly disseminated work.40
The 1976 Copyright Act, moreover, is clearly regulatory. It
suggests publication be accompanied by notice for copyright
protection or the copyright may be lost.4
The Act limits the
length of the term of rights and subjects all rights to fair use4 2
and the first sale doctrine.4 3 It distinguishes among different
kinds of copyrights, such as the copyright of compilations and
derivative works.44
Why do courts have difficulty focusing on the regulatory nature
of copyright law when resolving copyright issues? One response is
the narrow parameters the courts face in such cases. As the
Eleventh Circuit Court has characterized the setting of a copyright
case before a court: "[firequently, the court is presented with a
'good guy' copyright owner and a 'bad guy' ('pirate') copyist. As a
result, in affording relief, the interest of the public in the free flow
and availability of ideas is often overlooked."45

36 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J., concurring).
37 Patterson, supra note 32, at 62.
' Id. at 61. As Professor Patterson points out, the use of the work and the use of the
copyright are not reflexive-"[u]sing the copyright necessarily entails using the work, but
using the work does not necessarily entail using the copyright." Id. at 60-61.
39 Id. at 61.
40 id.
41 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
42 17 U.S.C. § 107.
43 17 U.S.C. § 109.
44 17 U.S.C. § 103.
41 Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1483
(lth Cir. 1991).
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Moreover, the concerns of the legislature are different than those
of a court. The legislature considers the general consequences of its
actions for all citizens, whereas the court considers the particular
consequences of its rulings for the parties before it.46 It is far
easier for a court, with its understanding of copyright shaped by a
natural law perspective, to apply property principles to resolve the
dispute.
The courts continued application of property principles to a
regulatory statute creates confusion.4 7 The danger of this confusion about copyright's regulatory versus proprietary nature is a
restraint in consumer access to copyrighted material," and, more
important, uncopyrighted material. As the 1976 Copyright Act
makes clear, a work is copyrightable only if it is an "original work
of authorship."49 What constitutes an "original work of authorship" is explained in the next section.
D. WHAT IS COPYRIGHTABLE MATERIAL?
QUA NON OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION.

ORIGINALITY IS THE SINE

In a landmark copyright decision, FeistPublications,Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., ° the Supreme Court strictly limited a
copyright owner's monopoly to original expressions and not the
underlying facts of a work. The Supreme Court reigned in the
scope of copyright by holding: "(1) copyright requires original
authorship; (2) anyone has a constitutional right to use unoriginal
material contained within copyrighted work; and (3) a copyright
owner's proof of infringement includes showing the copying of
component(s) that are original . . ."" The issue in Feist was the

degree of "originality" required for compilations to receive copyright

4Id.

47

Patterson, supra note 32, at 62.

at 10.
49 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
50 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
4Id.

61 L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A PreliminaryInquiry Into The Need For
A FederalStatute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 385, 387 (1992).
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protection. 2
The Feist Court emphasized originality as a constitutional
requirement for copyright protection53 and further imposed a
constitutional requirement for creativity." The Court's originality
standard requires "that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works) and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity."55
In addition to this constitutional requirement, Congress expressly
included a creativity requirement by requiring copyrightable works
be "original works of authorship."56 The Feist Court mandated a
minimal level of creativity before a work could receive copyright
protection. 57 "An author who claims infringement must prove the
existence of... intellectual production, of thought, and conception.""8 The consequence of this formulation is that "unoriginal"59 arrangements will be considered as being in the public

2 See Tracy Lea Meade, Note, Ex-Post Feist:

Application of a Landmark Copyright
Decision, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 251-52 (1994), setting out the facts as follows:
The Feist company published area-wide telephone directories. The
region covered by the Feist directory at issue included the area that
Rural Telephone had serviced exclusively with a phone directory. Both
directories contained white and yellow page sections, and they profited
from the sale of advertisements in the yellow page section. Feist was
unable to contract for the use of Rural's listings, so it copied listings from
Rural's directory. Feist's employees excluded listings outside the scope
of its directory and independently verified and supplemented the listings
copied from the Rural white pages. Some of Feist's listings, however,
mirrored those in the Rural directory, including four false entries
designed to detect copying.
The district court granted summary
judgment to Rural Telephone on its copyright infringement claim based
upon the evidence of actual copying. In an unpublished opinion, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling. Subsequently, the
United States Supreme Court granted Feist's petition for certiorari.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). The Supreme
Court articulated this requirement in The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879),
defining the constitutional term "writings" as "only such as are original,and are founded in
the creative powers of the mind."
' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
5'Id. at 345.
' 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). The earlier copyright statute referred to "all the writings
of an author." 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
57 Meade, supra note 52, at 253.
8 499 U.S. 340,362 (1991) (quoting Burow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,
59-60 (1883)).
59Id. at 363.
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domain and not afforded copyright protection by the compilation
copyright. 6°
Beyond its impact on compilations, the importance of Feist lies in
its express exclusion of facts or ideas in formulating a definition of
authorship. 6' An author's expression is protected not the underlying fact or idea, which is public domain material. The Feist Court
explains that "facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship."
The distinction is one between creation and discovery: "[t]he first
person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact;
he or she has merely discovered its existence. 2 The court
continues by asserting, "[tihis result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of
science and art.'6 3 This exclusion of facts from copyright protection, therefore, allows authors to exploit facts from the public
domain. 64
The lesson of Feist is that unoriginal works are not protected by
copyright law. Without originality, there can be no copyright
protection since "[c]opyright protection subsists ... in original

works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression
....

"65

And without a copyright, there can be no infringement of

the exclusive rights of a copyright owner. 6 This fact is important
because compulsory licenses, discussed in detail in the next section,
apply to a whole work, regardless of whether the work contains
uncopyrightable components.

6oMeade, supra note 52 at 253.
61 This

proposition was first announced in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). The

Copyright Act of 1976 states:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
62 Feist, 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
6Id.
at 350.
Meade, supra note 52, at 255.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
2750 provides:
"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
... is an infringer of the copyright..."
617
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III. COMPULSORY LICENSES
Congress has used compulsory licenses to keep pace with new
technology.6 7
One commentator suggests that a compulsory
license resembles "an unwritten contract which gives the user
unlimited use of the work or product in return for the promise that
he will pay a fee or royalty at some later date."'
Compulsory licenses were first introduced in the 1909 Copyright
Act and expanded under the 1976 Act. Because compulsory
licenses restrict copyright owners' power to exclude users once the
royalty fee is paid, copyright owners complain about their loss of
control. Compulsory licenses also force users to pay amounts that
may not reflect a work's worth. The history of Congress' choice to
impose compulsory licenses reveals that while copyright owners
complained loudly about them initially, they fight to keep them.6 9
In this section, the statutory history of the 1909 and 1976 Acts
are presented first. Next, the reasons for and against compulsory
licenses are addressed.
A.

STATUTORY HISTORY OF COMPULSORY LICENSES

1. 1909 CopyrightAct. The first compulsory license was granted
under the 1909 Act for mechanical sound reproductions.70 The
mechanical license allows the user to record a new version of a
recorded, publicly distributed song on a phonorecord7" e.g., piano
roll, record, cassette, compact disc and distribute the new version
after paying the royalty rate to the copyright owner.72 In one
67 Midge M. Hyman, Note, The Socialization of Copyright: The Increased Use of
Compulsory Licenses, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 105, 107; see generally, Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 430, reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 736 (1984) (stating "the law of copyright has developed in response to
significant changes in technology.") (footnotes omitted).
68 Hyman, supra note 67, at 107.
0 Interview, Professor L. Ray Patterson, February 12, 1995.
7 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), superseded by 17 U.S.C. § 115
(1988).
7 'Phonorecords" are defined as "material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed...." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
72 Robert Cassler, Copyright Compulsory Licenses-Are They Coming
or Going?, 37 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 231, 233 (1990).
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sense the license was introduced in response to new technology:
the manufacture of piano rolls capable of mechanically reproducing
copyrighted songs.73 In another sense, Congress imposed the
compulsory license to prevent one record company, the Aeolian
Company, which had been hoarding recording and publishing
rights, from gaining an industry-wide monopoly.74 These two
views are consistent because the new technology enabled that
company to monopolize the industry. Congress, then, chose to
implement a compulsory licensing scheme to reach a "balance
between adequate protection for the proprietor of a musical work
on the one75hand and the avoiding of 'a great music monopoly' on
the other."
2. 1976 Copyright Act. The 1976 Copyright Act modified the
mechanical compulsory license" and expanded the use of compulsory licenses into other areas. These areas included: retransmission by cable systems 7of broadcast signals; 77 public
performance
of music on jukeboxes; ' and public broadcasting. 79 In 1988 Con-

73See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (holding that

"perforated rolls" and machines that utilize them are not "copies within the meaning of
copyright act").
71 Scott L. Bach, Note, Music Recording, Publishing,and Compulsory Licenses: Toward
a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 389 (1986).
"' Shapiro, Bernstein, & Co. v. Remington Records, Inc., 265 F.2d 263, 269, 121 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 109 (2d Cir. 1959).
7" Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909) (stating original version of mechanical compulsory
license) with 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988) (raising compulsory license fee and modifying original
compulsory license).
" 17 U.S.C. § 111(cX1) states: "[Slecondary transmissions to the public by a cable system
of a primary transmission ... and embodying a performance or display of a work shall be
subject to compulsory licensing... ;" see generally 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(defining "primary" and "secondary" transmissions).
78 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), repealed by Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, § 3(a), 107 Stat. 2304 (1993). 17 U.S.C. § 116(aX2) stated:
"The operator of the coin-operated phonorecord player may obtain a compulsory license to
perform the work publicly on that phonorecord player by filing the application, afrxing the
certificate, and paying the royalties provided by [the statute's] subsection (b).* To harmonize
with the Berne Convention, a provision for a negotiated licenses replaced the compulsory
license in 1993. 17 U.S.C. § 116(b) (Supp. V 1993).
79 17 U.S.C. § 118(bX3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) states: "In the absence of a license
agreement.., the Librarian of Congress shall determine and publish a schedule of rates and
terms which ... shall be binding on all owners of copyright in works specified by this
subsection and public broadcasting entities, regardless of whether or not such copyright
owners have submitted proposals to the Librarian of Congress."
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gress added a compulsory license for retransmission by satellite
carriers of broadcast signals to private home viewers.8 °
The history of the early stages of 1976 Copyright Act revision
highlights the fact that compulsory licenses benefit copyright
owners. In 1961, the Register of Copyrights recommended the
elimination of compulsory licenses, although well received by
scholars and authors, the proposal was "drowned in a sea of
protests from the recording industry.""'
The record industry argued that compulsory licensing fosters "a
variety of recordings of the same musical works, provides authors
and publishers with greater public exposure from multiple recordings, and allows small record companies to compete with larger
ones by making recordings of the same music."12 The Register of
Copyrights countered these assertions in the 1961 report. He
argued, for example, that without compulsory licensing, popular
composers would be able to negotiate their own interests, large
record companies could not "steal away hits" originated by smaller
companies, and if it was true that authors and publishers benefited
from multiple recordings, "they would presumably seek to give nonexclusive licenses to several companies. " "R The strongest argument for eliminating the compulsory license was that the original
justification for compulsory licensing-to prevent an industry-wide
monopoly-was no longer applicable because of the development of
the music industry.8 4
The fact of the matter was that "record producers... regard[ed]
the compulsory license as too important to their industry to accept

o 17 U.S.C. § 119(aX1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) states: "[S]econdary transmissions of a
primary transmission made by a superstation and embodying a performance or display of
a work shall be subject to statutory licensing under this section if the secondary transmission
is made by a satellite carrier to the public for private home viewing, and the carrier makes
a direct or indirect charge for each retransmission service to each household receiving the
secondary transmission or to a distributor that has contracted with the carrier for direct or
indirect delivery of the secondary transmission to the public for private home viewing."
8' 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379,390 (citing, REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 34 (Comm. Print 1961),
reprintedin 3 GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976)).
82 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 391-392.
83

Id.

at 392 (citing REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE

GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 34 (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted in 3
GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976)).
84 id.
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its outright elimination."a" As the prime beneficiaries of compulsory licenses, the record industry producers would not, and did not,
allow Congress to alter the mechanical compulsory license-except,
of course, to increase the royalty rate.
B. THE REASONS FOR COMPULSORY LICENSES

Commentators have generally put forth three reasons for
compulsory licenses: (1) ensure public dissemination and authors'
compensation; (2) market failure-high transaction costs; and (3)
enforcement problems due to free riders. Although discussed
separately below, the three reasons are intertwined and to a degree
reinforce each other.
The most frequently cited reason for compulsory licenses is that
they ensure public dissemination while at the same time providing
some guaranteed compensation for copyright owners. The compulsory license is a practical solution, advocates argue, because it is
fair for the copyright owner to receive royalties and beneficial to
the public to have access to the work. The cable industry, for
example, argued that "[c]able television through its reception and
distribution of television broadcast signals, promotes the dissemination of knowledge to the public. Indeed, without this service,
of Americans would be denied the fruits of
significant numbers
86
labor."
creative
The second reason offered for compulsory licenses is market
failure. The private market place fails because copyright owners
are unable to negotiate with those desiring to use the copyrights;
the resulting transaction costs and delays are often invoked to
justify compulsory licenses. s7 For example, during the discussion
over Section 118, public broadcasters argued that compulsory
licenses were necessary to assure them "broad access to copyrighted
materials at reasonable royalties without protracted delays in
Id. at n.87.
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administrationof Justiceof the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 503 (1975) (testimony of Rex Bradley, Chairman, National Cable Television
Association).
" Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1132 (1977).
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obtainingpermission from copyright owners." "

When the House Committee on the Judiciary debated the
compulsory license for cable rebroadcasts, 9 it specifically addressed transaction costs, noting that "it would be impractical and
unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with
every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable
system.

Accordingly, the Committee has determined

...

to

establish a compulsory copyright license .... "9
The shortcoming of those positions is that they ignore the fact
that transaction costs are also detrimental to copyright users as
well as owners. Both parties have the incentive to use blanket
licensing as in the music industry such as that run by A.S.C.A.P.
Moreover, technology could allow two parties to negotiate through
a computer-based system containing a catalogue of copyrighted
works and corresponding royalty charges. 9 ' In the future, it may
be possible that technology will allow a copyright owner to track
subsequent transfers of his or her copyrighted work. As Professor
Goldstein concludes:
the variety of alternatives that could be devised is as
great as the ingenuity of private entrepreneurs to
strike the bargain that suits them best. Yet, these
efforts will be undertaken only if there exists the
exclusive rights to warrant them. By reaching so
quickly for the compulsory licensing solution, Congress effectively foreclosed experimentation with
possibly more efficient private alternatives.92
The third reason often cited for compulsory licenses, enforcement
problems from free riders, blends the first reason's notion of
fairness with the second reason's suggestion of transactional
obstacles. New technologies have created new ways in which to use

" Id. at 1138 (emphasis added) (quoting Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrightsof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,86th Cong. 1st Sess., The EconomicAspects
of the Compulsory License 100-101 (Comm. Print 1960)).
89 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1988).
90 H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
" Goldstein, supra note 87, at 1138.
92 Id. at 1139.
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copyrighted works and commercially exploit them. 3 Photocopying
machines, for example, allow for complete or partial copying of a
copyrighted work and then subsequent distribution without paying
the copyright owner. And in the extreme case, digitalized information can be instantaneously transmitted over the Internet to
potentially thousands of users. These redistributions of copies of
a copyrighted work, it is argued, deprive a copyright owner of fair
compensation.
These fears, however, assume the copyright owner has absolute
control of a copyrighted work; in actuality, the fair use doctrine
precludes such control.9 4 Also, as alluded to above, new technology may increase enforcement of copyrights. Thus, in the case of
legitimate infringement, the copyright owner will always have the
right to seek an injunction and/or statutory damages.
C. ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPULSORY LICENSES

Copyright owners and users both have reasons for disliking
compulsory licenses. The owners, of course, complain that the
royalty rates are set too low, and the users complain that the rates
are too high. The government-determined copyright royalty fee in
place, however, does not prevent the copyright owner and user from
negotiating a different rate.9 5 Often the parties negotiate a rate
lower than the government rate because the user can always
comply with the government rate.96 In this sense, the government
rate not only acts as a ceiling for how much a copyright owner can
demand for a popular work from a potential user, but serves as a
floor for unpopular works.
Compulsory licenses' intrusions into the market place impact the
investment in the development, production, and marketing of

' Ralph Oman, The Compulsory License Redux: Will it Survive in a Changing
Marketplace?, 5 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (1986).
94 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Because a complete fair use discussion is
beyond the scope of the note, see generally L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and
Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987).
" Robert Cassler, Copyright Compulsory Licenses-Are they Coming or Going?, 37 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y 231, 232 (1990).
" Id. n.5 (noting in footnote 5 that record companies often receive three-fourths (3/4)
government rate from artist for mechanical license).
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works.9 7 Because investment into a work is proportional to
expected value and returns, "compulsory licensing undercuts this
investment mechanism by placing an artificial ceiling on the
amount that can be recovered in the marketplace."" The possible
consequence is a reduced differentiation among works produced
because no work will attract investment in excess of the aggregate
returns determined by the compulsory licensing scheme." In this
sense, compulsory licenses may conflict with the purpose of the
Copyright Clause of promoting original works of authorship."°
While these arguments merit attention, the strongest argument
against compulsory licenses is not the price squabbles between
copyright users and sellers, but the constitutional conflict.
Although enacted by Congress, compulsory licenses extend the
copyright monopoly beyond the constitutional scope set forth in the
Copyright Clause and Supreme Court rulings because they fail to
distinguish uncopyrightable components.
Section 102 of the Copyright Act provides that "[a] protection
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device."'' Additionally, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated in Feist that "originality remains the sine qua non of
copyright"'1 2 and set out a minimum level of creativity required
to qualify as an original work entitled to copyright protection.
Unoriginal works or unoriginal components therein, therefore, are
not copyrightable, nor are works that have passed into the public
domain. Compulsory licenses, in such instances, require royalty
payments to authors or publishers of works that are not copyrightable. These authors and publishers are not entitled to this legal
subsidy under copyright law. That Congress has chosen to do so is
one concern, for a court to do so is a far greater one.

"7 Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1135 (1977).
9Id.

99 1d.
'00 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10' 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
'o' 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
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IV. JUDICIALLY IMPOSED COMPULSORY LICENSING

To the extent that compulsory licenses are unconstitutional, no
one can impose them. To the extent they simply lack convincing
public policy justification, only Congress is empowered to impose
them. The judicial branch does not have express or implied
constitutional or statutory authority to impose compulsory licenses.
Proponents of judicially-imposed compulsory licenses, however,
point to the Copyright Act itself as precedent for such power for the
courts. Section 405 of the 1976 Copyright Act addresses the
omission of notice on a copyrighted work publicly distributed by the
copyright owner before the effective date of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988.03 Subsection (b), deals with the
omission by innocent infringers and exempts from liability actual
or statutory damages for "any infringing acts committed before
receiving actual notice that registration for the work has been
made under section 408, if such person proves that he or she was
misled by the omission of notice." °4 In such a case, however, the
court:
may allow or disallow recovery of any of the infringer's profits attributable to the infringement, and
may enjoin the continuation of the infringing undertaking or may require, as a condition or permitting
the continuation of the infringing undertaking, that
the infringer pay the copyright owner a reasonable
license fee in an amount and on terms fixed by the
court.'0 5 (emphasis added)
The argument by proponents of empowering the courts is that this
express power to impose "reasonable license fees" in the case of
innocent infringers implies the power to do so in other contexts
where the equities are also clouded because an infringer was
innocent. The weakness in this statutory interpretation is that it

103 17 U.S.C. § 405 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-568, §§ 7(eXl)-(3),
102 Stat. 2858 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

1

04 Id.
105Id.
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goes against the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,which
is a rule of construction that means that where a legislature has
expressly conferred power in one situation, it does so at the
exclusion of all others. 0 6 The courts, therefore, cannot imply the
power to set a reasonable license fee except in the case of an
innocent infringer who infringes a copyright without actual notice
that the work was registered.
The second argument for judicially imposed compulsory licenses
is that they balance the equities between the parties better than an
injunction. In the "Betamax" case, Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Sony Corp. of America,0 7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
the manufacturers of video cassette recorders liable for copyright
contributory infringement arising from home taping of television
programs'0 ° and remanded for consideration of a continuing
royalty or lump some damages instead of an injunction.' 9 The
court reasoned that "when great public injury would result from an
injunction, a court could award damages or a continuing royalty.""0 The United States Supreme Court reversed on Sony's
liability"' and only Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion
approved the idea of a licensing scheme." 2
No less an authority than Professor Nimmer approved of the
Betamax court's suggestion of a court imposed compulsory license
when injunctions would cause great public harm." 3 By analogy
to property cases, he argues:
In nuisance cases, for example, the injured property
owner may be denied an injunction against the
objectionable activity where such an injunction would
work a substantial injury to the public interest as
well as to the interest of the particular defendant.

100

R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Canons of Construction in Georgia: "Anachronisms"in

Action, 25 GA. L. REV. 365, 373 (1991).
107 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
0

' 8 Id. at 976.

log
Id.
110
Id.
"'2 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 499-500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11 Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the
Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1530 (1982).
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Instead, the creator of the nuisance is given a license
to continue his damaging activity and required to
pay the property owner partial compensation for the
diminishment of the property's value. 14
This reasoning, however, confuses copyright's grant of limited
exclusive rights (quasi-property) with traditional property doctrine.
Statutory copyright law, in furtherance of the purposes of the
Copyright Clause, is a limited monopoly for a limited time and is
therefore regulatory in nature, not proprietary. Even assuming a
court could impose compulsory licensing, practical problems weigh
in favor of them not doing so.
Because courts can only fashion relief between the parties
involved, a practical problem with courts imposing a compulsory
license is that the license fees imposed most likely will not be
uniform across jurisdictions despite any similarity in facts." 5
Moreover, using American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc."6 as
an example, parties may stipulate the parameters of the conflict,
and the court is left deciding the case on a narrow scope. In that
case, the issue before the court concerned only eight articles that
one researcher photocopied." 7 The problem then arises that such
stipulations may not adequately reflect, and therefore not put
before the court for consideration, all the competing interests and
histories.
Finally, and most important, the Constitution specifically
delegates to Congress, and only Congress, the power to regulate
copyright. Courts, moreover, are ill-equipped to impose a remedy
as constitutionally questionable as compulsory licenses without the
express authorization from Congress.

114

Id. at 1530 n.88 (citing Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (1970); see also

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 951 cmt. a (1979) (indicating that damages may be

awarded in lieu of injunction because of countervailing public interest).
115Aaron Keyt, An Improved Frameworkfor Music PlagiarismLitigation,76 CAL. L. REV.
421, 459 (1988).
11637 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), order amended and superseded by 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir.
1994),
petition for cert. filed 63 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1995) (No. 94-1726).
11 7
id.
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V. CONCLUSION

As technology advances, copyright owners are attempting to
expand copyright protection to information in the public domain."8 They are seeking the legal subsidy of copyright law to
ensure profits from works that may not meet the statutory
requirements of originality or fixation. Copyright law, however,
can only protect the owner's right to profit as the market for his or
her work provides; 119 it can not create a profit by creating a new
market as compulsory licenses do. To the extent Congress chooses
to impose compulsory licenses to support public broadcasting or
emerging industries e.g., satellite transmission, then it is the only
branch of our democratic government authorized to do so. The
courts, lacking both the proper forum and perspective, should not
usurp the Constitution or Congress by imposing compulsory
licenses.
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